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You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation
Mind 100 (397):19-34 (1991)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)DOI
10.1093/mind/c.397.19
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Similar books and articles
In defense of psychological laws.Martin Carrier - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):217-232.
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Citations of this work
The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation.Carl F. Craver - 2014 - In Marie I. Kaiser, Oliver R. Scholz, Daniel Plenge & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Case of Biology and History. Springer Verlag. pp. 27-52.
Ceteris Paribus Laws.Alexander Reutlinger, Gerhard Schurz, Andreas Hüttemann & Siegfried Jaag - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Ceteris Paribus", There Is No Problem of Provisos.John Earman & John T. Roberts - 1999 - Synthese 118 (3):439 - 478.
Levelling counterfactual scepticism.Katie Steele & Alexander Sandgren - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):927-947.
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