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Non-Additive Beliefs in Solvable Games
Theory and Decision 49 (4):313-338 (2000)
Abstract
This paper studies how the introduction of non-additive probabilities (capacities) affects the solvability of strategic gamesLinks
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Citations of this work
Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox.Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (2):107-138.
Nash was a first to axiomatize expected utility.Han Bleichrodt, Chen Li, Ivan Moscati & Peter P. Wakker - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (3):309-312.
Bridging psychology and game theory yields interdependence theory.Paul A. M. Van Lange & Marcello Gallucci - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):177-178.
The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance.Burkhard C. Schipper - 2021 - Theory and Decision 90 (3-4):417-454.
References found in this work
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox.Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (2):107-138.
Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities.Ebbe Groes, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66.
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