Alternatives and incommensurables: The case of Darwin and Kelvin

Philosophy of Science 38 (4):502-507 (1971)
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Abstract

If, as it is usually understood, incommensurable theories must be compatible then one need never choose between two such theories. But if theories were incompatible and incommensurable one would have to choose between them. What if they are incompatible only outside the domain of observation? The fact that Darwin's biology can clash with Kelvin's physics (each with their respective auxiliary assumptions) regarding the age of the earth shows how commensurable theories may yet be incompatible. But it also shows that they need not be alternatives--i.e. that one may not be able to simply and satisfactorily replace the other in our world view. But standard examples of scientific revolutions consist of the replacement of one theory by another in one's world view. These alternative theories must therefore be more than merely incompatible--what do they share if not content? (I.e. they must be commensurable.)

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Jagdish Hattiangadi
York University

Citations of this work

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The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
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Against'normal science'.John Wn Watkins - 1970 - In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.

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