Sunstein's heuristics provide insufficient descriptive and explanatory adequacy

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):553-554 (2005)

Abstract
In considering a domain of knowledge – language, music, mathematics, or morality – it is necessary to derive principles that can describe the mature state and explain how an individual reaches this state. Although Sunstein's heuristics go some way toward a description of our moral sense, it is not clear that they are at the right level of description, and as stated, they provide no guidelines for looking at the acquisition process – the problem of explanatory adequacy.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x0534009x
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