Sensitive moderate invariantism

In Knowledge and lotteries. New York: Oxford University Press (2004)
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Abstract

This chapter examines sensitive moderate invariantism, and how it may help the puzzle. It describes two mechanisms that bear on the truth of knowledge claims; ones that are similar to contextualist machinery except that they are conceived of as making for subject-sensitivity. The sensitive moderate invariantist claims that the extension of ‘know’ depends not only on the kinds of actors traditionally adverted to accounts of knowledge but also on the kinds of factors that in the contextualist’s hands make for ascriber-dependence.

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John Hawthorne
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.

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