Skeptical and moderate invariantism

In Knowledge and lotteries. New York: Oxford University Press (2004)
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Abstract

This chapter examines the two kinds of invariantism: sceptical and moderate. The sceptical invariantist claims that the sematic value of the word ‘know’ is such that all or nearly all ordinary positive knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are false. The moderate invariantist claims that the semantic value of ‘know’ is such that many of the positive knowledge ascriptions that we make in daily life are true. A moderate invariantist treatment of the puzzle is discussed.

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John Hawthorne
University of Southern California

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