Noûs 45 (1):126-166 (2011)

Authors
Robert May
University of California, Davis
Richard Kimberly Heck
Brown University
Abstract
Are Fregean thoughts compositionally complex and composed of senses? We argue that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege took 'conceptual contents' to be unstructured, but that he quickly moved away from this position, holding just two years later that conceptual contents divide of themselves into 'function' and 'argument'. This second position is shown to be unstable, however, by Frege's famous substitution puzzle. For Frege, the crucial question the puzzle raises is why "The Morning Star is a planet" and "The Evening Star is a planet" have different contents, but his second position predicts that they should have the same content. Frege's response to this antinomy is of course to distinguish sense from reference, but what has not previously been noticed is that this response also requires thoughts to be compositionally complex, composed of senses. That, however, raises the question just how thoughts are composed from senses. We reconstruct a Fregean answer, one that turns on an insistence that this question must be understood as semantic rather than metaphysical. It is not a question about the intrinsic nature of residents of the third realm but a question about how thoughts are expressed by sentences.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00769.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.

View all 84 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Predication as Ascription.David Liebesman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):517-569.
Quantifying In From a Fregean Perspective.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):207-253.
Concept Designation.Arvid Båve - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):331-344.
Formality of Logic and Frege’s Begriffsschrift.Daniele Mezzadri - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):182-207.
A Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality.Bob Fischer - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):228-247.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

What's Wrong with McKinsey-Style Reasoning?James Pryor - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200.
The Structure of Frege's Thoughts.Marian Zouhar - 2011 - History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):199-209.
The Truth of Thoughts: Variations on Fregean Themes.Oswaldo Chateaubriand - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):199-215.
I. Frege as a Realist.Michael Dummett - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):455-468.
A Repair of Frege’s Theory of Thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-21

Total views
744 ( #5,584 of 2,330,039 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #60,106 of 2,330,039 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes