American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):61-71 (1991)
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Abstract |
Our suspicion is that philosophers who tie the fate of agency to advances in cognitive science simultaneously underestimate that conception's tenacity and overestimate their ability to divine the course of empirical inquiry. For the present, however, we shall pretend that current ideas about what would be required for the scientific vindication of folk psychology are apt, and ask where this leaves the notion of agency. Our answer will be that it leaves that notion on the whole unaffected.
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Keywords | Belief Causation Desire Intentionality Metaphysics |
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The Supervenience Argument.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & Ausonio Marras - 2008 - In S. Gozzano & F. Oralia (eds.), Universals, Tropes and the Philosophy of Mind. Ontos Verlag. pp. 101-132.
Causally Relevant Properties.David Braun - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9 (AI, Connectionism and Philosophi):447-75.
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