Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):233 – 244 (2006)
AbstractIn recent work on truth and truthmaking, D. M. Armstrong has defended a version of 'truthmaker necessitarianism', the doctrine that truths necessitate truthmakers. Truthmaker necessitarianism, he contends, requires the postulation of 'totality facts', which serve as ingredients of truthmakers for general truths and negative truths, and propositions, which function as the fundamental truth bearers. I argue that neither totality facts nor propositions need figure in an account of truthmaking, and suggest that both are artifacts stemming, albeit in different ways, from an ontologically shady 'linguisticizing' tendency to conflate features of descriptions and features of what is described.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics.John Bigelow - 1988 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
Time, Leeway, and the Laws of Nature: Why Humean Compatibilists Cannot Be Eternalists.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (1):51-71.
Similar books and articles
Negative Truths From Positive Facts?1.Josh Parsons - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):591 – 602.
A World of Truthmakers.Philipp Keller - 2007 - In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag. pp. 18--105.
Postscript to Why Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2008 - In E. J. Lowe & A. Rami (eds.), Truth and Truth-making. Acumen Publishing.