Philosophia 47 (1):131-139 (2019)

Authors
Paul Henne
Lake Forest College
Jen Semler
Cambridge University
Abstract
Many philosophers claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In light of recent empirical evidence, however, some skeptics conclude that philosophers should stop assuming the principle unconditionally. Streumer, however, does not simply assume the principle’s truth; he provides arguments for it. In this article, we argue that his arguments fail to support the claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Freedom and Reason.R. M. Hare - 1963 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.

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Citations of this work BETA

I Ought to Reply, So I Can.Bart Streumer - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1547-1554.

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