Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):521 - 531 (2012)
Most moral philosophers agree that if a moral agent is incapable of performing some act ϕ because of a physical incapacity, then they do not have a reason to ϕ. Most also claim that if an agent is incapable of ϕ-ing due to a psychological incapacity, brought about by, for example, an obsession or phobia, then this does not preclude them from having a reason to ϕ. This is because the 'ought implies can' principle is usually interpreted as a claim about physical, rather than psychological, capacities. In this paper I argue for an opposing view: if we don't have reasons to do things that we are physically incapable of doing, then neither do we have reasons to do things we are psychologically incapable of doing. I also argue that extending the 'ought implies can' principle to psychological capacities makes the principle more attractive
|Keywords||Reasons for action Capacities Ought implies can Korsgaard Pettit Smith|
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References found in this work BETA
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1984 - MIT Press.
Skepticism About Practical Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason.Nicholas Rescher - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
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