Reasons for Action and Psychological Capacities

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):521 - 531 (2012)
Abstract
Most moral philosophers agree that if a moral agent is incapable of performing some act ϕ because of a physical incapacity, then they do not have a reason to ϕ. Most also claim that if an agent is incapable of ϕ-ing due to a psychological incapacity, brought about by, for example, an obsession or phobia, then this does not preclude them from having a reason to ϕ. This is because the 'ought implies can' principle is usually interpreted as a claim about physical, rather than psychological, capacities. In this paper I argue for an opposing view: if we don't have reasons to do things that we are physically incapable of doing, then neither do we have reasons to do things we are psychologically incapable of doing. I also argue that extending the 'ought implies can' principle to psychological capacities makes the principle more attractive
Keywords Reasons for action  Capacities  Ought implies can  Korsgaard  Pettit  Smith
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Princeton University Press.
Skepticism About Practical Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.

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