Does Reasonable Nonbelief Exist?

Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):75-92 (2001)
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Abstract

J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason claims that the existence of reflective persons who long to solve the problem of God’s existencebut cannot do so constitutes an evil rendering God’s existence improbable. In this essay, I present Schellenberg’s argument and argue that the kind of reasonable nonbelief Schellenberg needs for his argument to succeed is unlikely to exist. Since Schellenberg’s argument is an inductive-style version of the problem of evil, the empirical improbability of the premise I challenge renders the conclusions derived from it empirically improbable as well.

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Douglas Henry
Baylor University

Citations of this work

Two solutions to the problem of divine hiddenness.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):119 - 134.
Divine hiddenness as divine mercy.Travis Dumsday - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (2):183 - 198.
Hiddenness of God.Daniel Howard-Snyder & Adam Green - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil.J. L. Schellenberg - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (1):45-60.

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