Conceivability and modal knowledge
In Tamara Horowitz (ed.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield (1991)
I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.
|Keywords||Experiment, Knowledge, Modality, Thought|
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