Belief Revision I: The AGM Theory

Philosophy Compass 8 (7):604-612 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Belief revision theory studies how an ideal doxastic agent should revise her beliefs when she receives new information. In part I I will first present the AGM theory of belief revision (Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson 1985). Then I will focus on the problem of iterated belief revisions

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1111/phc3.12048

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Belief Revision II: Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):613-621.
Coherence, Justification, and the AGM Theory of Belief Revision.Michael J. Shaffer - 2002 - In Yves Bouchard (ed.), Perspectives on Coherentism. Editions du Scribe. pp. 139--160.
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
The AGM Theory for Belief Revision.Li-wen Xiong - 2005 - Modern Philosophy 1 (3):127-131.
The AGM Theory for Belief Revision.Xong Liwen - 2005 - Modern Philosophy 1 (3):018.
The cost of consistency: information economy in Paraconsistent Belief Revision.Rafael Testa - 2015 - South American Journal of Logic 1 (2):461-480.
Belief Revision From the Point of View of Doxastic Logic.Krister Segerberg - 1995 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 3 (4):535-553.
Belief revision in a temporal framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof R. Apt & Robert Van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interactions. Amsterdam University Press.
Resource-bounded belief revision and contraction.Mark Jago - 2006 - In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. pp. 141--154.
Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change Without Dispositional Coherence.Hans Rott - 2003 - Journal of Logic and Computation 13 (1):111-145.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-07-24

Downloads
114 (#160,519)

6 months
779 (#1,502)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Franz Huber
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.
Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
Belief Revision Theory.Hanti Lin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 349-396.
Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.

View all 26 references / Add more references