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Abstract
Intuition-based argumentation is ubiquitous across most philosophical subfields. Moral and political philosophers in particular frequently justify normative principles on the basis of thought experiments that evoke judgments about specific cases. Lately, however, intuitions have come under attack and their justificatory force is being questioned. This essay asks whether we can acknowledge the epistemic fallibility of intuitions, while nevertheless reaching reliable normative conclusions. To that effect I investigate three different strategies of relating specific intuitions and more general normative principles: the intuitionist, coherentist, and foundationalist methods. Showing that none of them succeeds in making up for the problematic epistemic status of intuitions in the justificatory process, I conclude that normative principles are unreliable to the extent that they are based on thought-experiments.
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DOI 10.1515/dzph-2020-0047
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.

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