Theories of truth and truth-value gaps

Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559 (1993)
The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson''s definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language is possible.
Keywords Davidson  theories of truth  truth-value gaps
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DOI 10.1007/BF00985433
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