Why propensities cannot be probabilities

Philosophical Review 94 (4):557-570 (1985)
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reprint Humphreys, Paul W. (2010) "Why propensities cannot be probabilities". In Eagle, Antony, Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, pp. : Routledge (2010)

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Paul Humphreys
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures.Patrick Suppes - 2002 - CSLI Publications (distributed by Chicago University Press).
Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.

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