- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Why propensities cannot be probabilities
Philosophical Review 94 (4):557-570 (1985)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Author's Profile
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
Why propensities cannot be probabilities.Paul W. Humphreys - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge.
Why propensities cannot be probabilities, Paul Humphreys proposed accounts of probability are usually required to satisfy the standard axioms of the probability calculus. Because of the fundamentally causal nature of propensities, they cannot do this, primarily because in-version formulas such as the multiplication axiom and bayes' theorem do.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (4).
Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.
Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities II.David Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (4):581-589.
Why the mind seems to be, and yet cannot be, produced by the brain.H. Wildon Carr - 1914 - Philosophical Review 23 (3):257-270.
Conditional probabilities and compounds of conditionals.Vann McGee - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (4):485-541.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-01-28
Downloads
198 (#17,406)
6 months
19 (#786,843)
2009-01-28
Downloads
198 (#17,406)
6 months
19 (#786,843)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
First principles in the life sciences: the free-energy principle, organicism, and mechanism.Matteo Colombo & Cory Wright - 2021 - Synthese 198 (14):3463–3488.
Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures.Patrick Suppes - 2002 - CSLI Publications (distributed by Chicago University Press).
Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.
Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory.Phil Dowe - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (2):195-216.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6686886f5-5pqs9 uwo