Externalization is common to all value judgments, and norms are motivating because of their intersubjective grounding

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41:21-21 (2018)
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Abstract

We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.

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Author Profiles

Carme Isern-Mas
Universitat de les Illes Balears

Citations of this work

Naturalizing Darwall's Second Person Standpoint.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - 2020 - Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Scienc 54:785–804.
Love, friendship, and moral motivation.Carme Isern-Mas - 2022 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 42 (2):93-107.
Norm Externalisation and the Evolution of Cooperation.Martina Valković - 2023 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):19-33.

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References found in this work

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Edward N. Zalta (ed.) - 2014 - Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab.

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