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Abstract
We show that externalization is a feature not only of moral judgment, but also of value judgment in general. It follows that the evolution of externalization was not specific to moral judgment. Second, we argue that value judgments cannot be decoupled from the level of motivations and preferences, which, in the moral case, rely on intersubjective bonds and claims.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X18000092
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Naturalizing Darwall's Second Person Standpoint.Carme Isern-Mas & Antoni Gomila - forthcoming - Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Scienc.
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