Authors
Frank Jackson
Australian National University
Abstract
I argue, first, that there is a problem for his account of reduction as it stands; second, that the change that needs to be made is relatively clear ; but, third, that when the needed change is made, his claim that the best form of physicalism is a reductive one amounts to the claim that the best form of physicalism is the ‘Australian’ type-type identity version. I do not see this as an objection—far from it.
Keywords Identity  Metaphysics  Physicalism  Reduction  Kim, J
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00227.x
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