Philosophy 74 (4):535-555 (1999)

Jonathan A. Jacobs
CUNY Graduate Center
The main claims are the following. If we keep before us the distinction between the justification of punishment and its aims, we see that retribution is not an aim of punishment, and that there is a central place for retributivist considerations in the justification of punishment. Justifications based upon aims or consequentialist considerations suffer from a serious epistemic vulnerability not shared by retributivism. There are ethically sound sentiments that underwrite retributivist justification, and it would be a mistake to redeploy those sentiments. The ethical authority of those sentiments justifies punitive sanction. Retributivist justification is compatible with consequentialist aims
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819199000662
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