A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism

In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge (2010)
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Citations of this work

Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).
Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.
Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

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