Abstract

Here find four chapters as the first publication of the Woodbridge Lectures and Kant Lectures ; chapters 5 and 6, "On the Biological Basis of Language Capacities" and "Language and Unconscious Knowledge," have, substantively, appeared as parts of other books. This is an excellent book for philosophers, almost wholly given to theoretical-philosophical issues. A complementary process to the one William James outlined respecting the reception of a new idea is that the purveyor of the new idea, stung by dismissive and misleading rejection and acceptance, eventually ascribes his opponent’s characterization of his own position to them. This is Chomsky’s attack on his opponent’s anti-scientific, anti-realist, speciesist, methodological, and mystical dualism. And Descartes is hardly championed. Scientific linguistics and psychology study the species-specific, componentialized, innately and biologically structured, largely unconscious and introspectively inaccessible, cognitive organs. H. Putnam’s new Kantianism is pummeled, as is Dummett’s anti-realism. The logical behaviorist-ordinary language critics are reproved, and it is curious how quaint the Wittgensteinian style impossibility-of-psychology-and-there-is-nothing-to-explain razzmatazz now seems. This is a compact, sharp, and coherent expression of themes explicit or implicit in Chomsky’s earliest work, and one not likely to be wholly pleasant to those joyed by what he was saying in the late 1960s. Whatever one’s persuasion, it also suggests that Chomsky has tried to respond to his myriad philosophical opponents comprehensively, in depth, and in detail—virtues which many of them seem shockingly unwilling to extend to him., never having read any other work of Chomsky’s or other linguists. On being shown that his paper was straight irrelevant to more than a decade of active work in linguistic theory, he seemed to take it that this suggested the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of Noam Chomsky and linguistic science.)—J.L.