A paradox of definability: Richard'S and poincaré'S ways out

History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):33-44 (1994)
In 1905, Richard discovered his paradox of definability, and in a letter written that year he presented both the paradox and a solution to it.Soon afterwards, Poincaré endorsed a variant of Richard?s solution.In this paper, I critically examine Richard?s and Poincaré?s ways out.I draw on an objection of Peano?s, and argue that their stated solutions do not work.But I also claim that their writings suggest another way out, different from their stated solutions, and different from the orthodox Tarskian approach.I argue that this second solution does not prevent the return of the paradox
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DOI 10.1080/01445349408837223
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References found in this work BETA
Jean Van Heijenoort (ed.) (1967). From Frege to Gödel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Keith Simmons (1990). The Diagonal Argument and the Liar. Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (3):277 - 303.
H. Poincaré (1906). Logique. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 14:294-317.
H. Poincaré (1909). Infini. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 17:461-482.

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Keith Simmons (1994). Paradoxes of Denotation. Philosophical Studies 76 (1):71 - 106.

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