AI and Society 6 (4):305-323 (1992)

The development of computers as ‘mind tools’ has generated intriguing and provocative views about their potential human-like qualities. In this paper an attempt is made to explore the ‘real’ nature of computers by an examination of three widely different perspective, (1) the common-sense view of computers as tools; (2) the provocative view of computers as persons; and (3) the challenging view of computers as texts. In the course of the discussion an extended critique of the use of anthropomorphic terms in relation to machines is conducted and the fundamental differences between human persons and machines is reasserted
Keywords Act  Anthropomorphism  Categorial framework  Intentionality  Person  Symbol
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DOI 10.1007/BF02472784
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Minds, Brains and Science.John Searle - 1984 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Society Of Mind.Marvin L. Minsky - 1986 - Simon & Schuster.
Intentional Systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.

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