Abstract

I conclude with some brief remarks concerning the notion of an object qua object. I suggest that the ultimate plausibility of the relational account rests upon the extent to which this notion can be ontologically "neutralized." ;In Chapter IV, I discuss three major kinds of objections made against Brentano's early view. I argue, first, that the view is not incompatible with our general notion of a relation. I argue, secondly, that the view can account for the data given to us directly in experience. Finally, I take up the problem of non-existent objects. I compare Brentano's view with the most plausible alternative view, which is a version of alternative . I argue that Brentano's view, supplemented with an ontologically neutral notion of an object, is preferable. ;In Chapter III, I turn to Brentano's later views, which imply a solution to the problem of non-existent objects along the lines of . On Brentano's reistic view of the world, there are no relations. Mental acts are therefore not relations. The problem of non-existent objects is, for the later Brentano, merely the problem of how to eliminate apparent references to such objects from our philosophical talk about the world. I argue that Brentano's proposed translation procedure is inadequate and that his theory of relations is untenable insofar as it collapses the distinction between act and object. ;In Chapter II, I examine Brentano's early view. Because of the scholastic terms he uses to define mental acts, the early Brentano is interpreted as holding a version of . On this interpretation, objects of mental acts have a mind-dependent "intentional" or "immanent" existence even if they do not have real existence. I argue on philosophical grounds that his theory is untenable, and on textual grounds that Brentano was not committed to it. I go on to explicate Brentano's early view according to . ;In Chapter I, I discuss the problems which confront the relational view of mental acts. The most serious is the problem of non-existent objects. If mental acts are relations and unicorns do not exist, then how can my act of thinking relate me to a unicorn whenever I think of one? Four general answers seem possible: Although the unicorn I am thinking of does not exist, it nevertheless has some sort of ontological status sufficient to ground it as a term of this particular relation. Mental acts only appear as relational but careful analysis shows them not to be. The mental connection between me and the unicorn is not a relation at all, but some other sort of connection. A mental act is a relation which, unlike ordinary relations, can obtain between an existent and a nonexistent. ;What is a mental act? Franz Brentano gave two distinct answers to this question. According to the early Brentano, a mental act is a binary relation which obtains between a self and an object. The later Brentano, however, was a convert to Reism, a doctrine according to which there are no relations in the world. He was compelled, therefore, to abandon his earlier view in favor of one in which mental acts are regarded as accidental extensions of a thinking substance. The purpose of my dissertation is to examine these views and to defend the earlier one. My main concern is philosophical, although I do pay close attention to Brentano's texts