Philosophical Investigations 35 (2):101-126 (2012)

Matthias Kiesselbach
DFG India Office
According to a standard criticism, Robert Brandom's “normative pragmatics”, i.e. his attempt to explain normative statuses in terms of practical attitudes, faces a dilemma. If practical attitudes and their interactions are specified in purely non-normative terms, then they underdetermine normative statuses; but if normative terms are allowed into the account, then the account becomes viciously circular. This paper argues that there is no dilemma, because the feared circularity is not vicious. While normative claims do exhibit their respective authors' practical attitudes and thereby contribute towards establishing the normative statuses they are about, this circularity is not a mark of Brandom's explanatory strategy but a feature of social practice of which we theorists partake
Keywords Rule-Following  Pragmatism  Meaning  Value  Normative Pragmatics  Brandom  Social practice
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01450.x
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

On Being Bound to Linguistic Norms. Reply to Reinikainen and Kaluziński.Matthias Kiesselbach - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (4):1-14.

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