is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem to be both guided and "normatively" constrained by something general in performing particular actions. The current discussion takes off from Wittgenstein's work. On his use, a 'rule' is anything that can be followed such that: i) our having, grasp, or use of it can play a role in generating and explaining our action; and, ii) our actions can accord or discord with it, in some sense. Wittgenstein’s examples of such rules are intentions, requests, and orders, and functions and properties used as principles for doing things (e. g. continuing a series, sorting). The topic is important since it has connections with representation, content and meaning. The ensuing discussion focuses on two separate questions. First, what does one's following a particular rule (rather than another one) consist in? This was the question that Kripke focused on in his important commentary under the guise of the question what does one's meaning something by a word consist in (see also the section Kripkenstein on Meaning). Second, how does one move from the general rule to its application to a particular case? This question has been in the focus on recent work by Boghossian and Wright who argue that a puzzle is generated by the fact that rule-following must involve inference, whereas inference itself seems to involve rule-following.