Perspectives on Science 13 (4):495-530 (2005)

Abstract
: In this essay I argue that Kuhn's account of science, as it was articulated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was mainly defended on philosophical rather than historical grounds. I thus lend support to Kuhn's later claim that his model can be derived from first principles. I propose a transcendental reading of his work and I suggest that Kuhn uses historical examples as anti-essentialist Wittgensteinian "reminders" that expose a variegated landscape in the development of science
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DOI 10.1162/106361405775466117
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References found in this work BETA

Zettel.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1967 - Berkeley and Los Angeles: Blackwell.
Critique of Pure Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1998 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Challenge of Scientific Revolutions: Van Fraassen's and Friedman's Responses.Vasso Kindi - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):327-349.
Taking a Look at History.Vasso Kindi - 2014 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 8 (1):96-117.

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