Cognition 177:165-171 (2018)

Authors
Markus Kneer
University of Zürich
Abstract
Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such they are at the heart of our linguistic and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one should only assert that p if p is true (the truth account). In a series of four experiments, this question is addressed empirically. Contrary to previous findings, knowledge turns out to be a poor predictor of assertability, and the norm of assertion is not factive either. The studies here presented provide empirical evidence in favour of the view that a speaker is warranted to assert that p only if her belief that p is justified.
Keywords assertion  norms of assertion  norm  knowledge  truth  justification  Williamson  speech act
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DOI 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.03.020
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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Citations of this work BETA

No Knowledge Required.Kevin Reuter & Peter Brössel - 2018 - Episteme 16 (3):303-321.
Revisiting Norms of Assertion.John Turri - 2018 - Cognition 177:8-11.
Assertion and its Social Significance: An Introduction.Bianca Cepollaro, Paolo Labinaz & Neri Marsili - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 13 (1):1-18.
When Alston Met Brandom: Defining Assertion.Matthew J. Cull - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 13 (1):36-50.

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