The person as moralist account and its alternatives

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):353-365 (2010)
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Abstract

The commentators offer helpful suggestions at three levels: (1) explanations for the particular effects discussed in the target article; (2) implications of those effects for our understanding of the role of moral judgment in human cognition; and (3) more theoretical questions about the overall relationship between ordinary cognition and systematic science. The present response takes up these three issues in turn

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2013-10-27

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Joshua Knobe
Yale University

Citations of this work

Nozick’s experience machine: An empirical study.Frank Hindriks & Igor Douven - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):278-298.
Explanatory Unification in Experimental Philosophy: Let’s Keep It Real.Frank Hindriks - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):219-242.

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