Access and what it is like

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260 (1995)
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Abstract

Block's cases of superblindsight, the pneumatic drill, and the Sperling experiments do not show that P-consciousness and Aconsciousness can come apart. On certain tendentious but not implausible construals of the concepts of P- and A-consciousness, they refer to the same psychological phenomenon.

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Bernard Kobes
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
Author's response.Ned Block - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1).
P-consciousness presentation/a-consciousness representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

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