Blocking out the distinction between sensation and perception: Superblindsight and the case of Helen

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258 (1995)
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Abstract

Block's notion of P-consciousness catches too much in its net. He would do better to exclude all states that do not have a sensory component. I question what he says about my work with the “blind” monkey, Helen.

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Citations of this work

Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 247--273.
Perception without awareness.Fred Dretske - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 147--180.
Adaptive complexity and phenomenal consciousness.Shaun Nichols & Todd Grantham - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):648-670.
In reply.N. Humphrey - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):98-112.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.

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