Authors
Jaakko Kuorikoski
University of Helsinki
Abstract
This paper aims to provide Humean metaphysics for the interventionist theory of causation. This is done by appealing to the hierarchical picture of causal relations as being realized by mechanisms, which in turn are identified with lower-level causal structures. The modal content of invariances at the lowest level of this hierarchy, at which mechanisms are reduced to strict natural laws, is then explained in terms of projectivism based on the best-system view of laws
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12021
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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