Assertion, knowledge, and invariant standards

Abstract

Epistemic contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions for knowledge attributions can vary across contexts as a result of shifting epistemic standards. According to Keith DeRose, the “chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the concern that the contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of..

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Scorekeeping trolls.William Tuckwell & Kai Tanter - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):215-224.
Stabilizing Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):116-139.
The appearance of ignorance.Keith DeRose - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
An invalid argument for contextualism.Thomas A. Blackson - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):344–345.
Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
An Invalid Argument for Contextualism.Thomas A. Blackson - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):344-345.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
49 (#334,028)

6 months
3 (#1,045,901)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references