Assertion, knowledge, and invariant standards

Abstract
Epistemic contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions for knowledge attributions can vary across contexts as a result of shifting epistemic standards. According to Keith DeRose, the “chief bugaboo of contextualism has been the concern that the contextualist is mistaking variability in the conditions of..
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