About this topic
Summary

Epistemic contextualism is a semantic thesis about the meaning of the word "knows" and its cognates. Invariantism, which is the more traditional view, holds that the truth or falsity of sentences like "Mary knows that the bank is open on Saturday" does not shift from context to context. Contextualists, however, argue that such a sentence can be true in one context but not another. A typical model here is the case of indexical expressions, like "I" or "here." My utterance of "I am President" can be false while Obama's is true. Some contextualists have argued that contextualism solves the problem of skepticism: e.g. "I know I have hands" is true out on the street but false in the philosophy classroom, where the context raises the standards for knowledge. Others have claimed that contextualism yields the best explanation for why our ordinary usage of "knows" varies with what is at stake for us or which error-possibilities we have in mind. Attempting to capture some of the same phenomena as contextualism, various forms of invariantism have been developed. These include subject-sensitive invariantism, moderate and skeptical pragmatic invariantism and psychological error theories. According to subject-sensitive invariantism, “knows” invariably expresses the knowledge relation. The seeming sensitivity of "knows" arises from the supposed fact that this relation is sensitive to non-epistemic features of the subject (such as what is at stake for her or which error-possibilities are salient in her conversational context). According to moderate and skeptical pragmatic invariantism, the variability of “knows” should be attributed not to semantic but to pragmatic factors (such as implicatures). Moderate pragmatic invariantists hold that, semantically, “knows” invariably expresses an epistemic relation we tend to satisfy in many ordinary situations. Skeptical pragmatic invariantists hold that, semantically, “knows” invariably expresses an epistemic relation that is rarely if ever satisfied. According to psychological error theories, the variability of “knows” should be explained neither semantically nor pragmatically but by appeal to psychological biases and similar aspects of the psychology of knowledge ascribing subjects. 

Key works

Relevant alternatives theories (e.g. Dretske 1970) may be seen as a forerunner of contextualism. Explicitly contextualist theories, however, begin primarily with Cohen 1986, DeRose 1992, and Lewis 1996. Subject-sensitive invariantism begins with Fantl & McGrath 2002, Hawthorne 2003, and Stanley 2005. Rysiew 2001 is an early defense of moderate pragmatic invariantism. Skeptical pragmatic invariantism is prominently defended in Davis 2007. Psychological error theories begin with Hawthorne 2003, where the mechanism primarily invoked is the so-called "availability heuristic." The view is forcefully criticized in Nagel 2010. More elaborate psychological error theories are defended in Nagel 2008 and Nagel 2010. The data motivating contextualism have also been discussed in experimental philosophy. Schaffer & Knobe 2012 discuss a range of studies.

Introductions The free encyclopedia entries by Rysiew 2007 and Black 2003 provide excellent introductions to contextualism. Buckwalter 2012 provides an overview of relevant empirical literature.
Related categories

271 found
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1 — 50 / 271
  1. added 2019-01-09
    Projective Adaptivism.Leonid Tarasov - forthcoming - Philosophical Papers:1-24.
    Moderate invariantism is the orthodox semantics for knowledge attributions (i.e., sentences of the form ⌜S knows/doesn’t know that Φ⌝). In recent years it has fallen out of favour, in large part because it fails to explain why ordinary speakers have the intuition that some utterances of knowledge attributions are felicitous and others infelicitous (felicity intuitions) in several types of cases. To address this issue moderate invariantists have developed a variety of what I call non-semantic theories (aka error theories) which they (...)
  2. added 2018-10-16
    Interest-Relative Invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge.
  3. added 2018-09-22
    Nothing at Stake in Knowledge.David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich, Mario Alai, Adriano Angelucci, Renatas Berniūnas, Emma E. Buchtel, Amita Chatterjee, Hyundeuk Cheon, In‐Rae Cho, Daniel Cohnitz, Florian Cova, Vilius Dranseika, Ángeles Eraña Lagos, Laleh Ghadakpour, Maurice Grinberg, Ivar Hannikainen, Takaaki Hashimoto, Amir Horowitz, Evgeniya Hristova, Yasmina Jraissati, Veselina Kadreva, Kaori Karasawa, Hackjin Kim, Yeonjeong Kim, Minwoo Lee, Carlos Mauro, Masaharu Mizumoto, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Christopher Y. Olivola, Jorge Ornelas, Barbara Osimani, Carlos Romero, Alejandro Rosas Lopez, Massimo Sangoi, Andrea Sereni, Sarah Songhorian, Paulo Sousa, Noel Struchiner, Vera Tripodi, Naoki Usui, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado, Giorgio Volpe, Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian, Xueyi Zhang & Jing Zhu - 2017 - Noûs.
    In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...)
  4. added 2018-09-12
    Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and Presuppositions develops a novel account of epistemic contextualism based on the idea that pragmatic presuppositions play a central role in the semantics of knowledge attributions. According to Blome-Tillmann, knowledge attributions are sensitive to what is pragmatically presupposed at the context of ascription. The resulting theory--Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism (PEC)--is simple and straightforward, yet powerful enough to have far-reaching and important consequences for a variety of hotly debated issues in epistemology and philosophy of language. -/- In this book, Blome-Tillmann first (...)
  5. added 2018-09-12
    Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.
    The paper explicates a new way to model the context-sensitivity of 'knows', namely a way that suggests a close connection between the content of 'knows' in a context C and what is pragmatically presupposed in C. After explicating my new approach in the first half of the paper and arguing that it is explanatorily superior to standard accounts of epistemic contextualism, the paper points, in its second half, to some interesting new features of the emerging account, such as its compatibility (...)
  6. added 2018-09-06
    Interests, Evidence and Games.Brian Weatherson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):329-344.
    Pragmatic encroachment theories have a problem with evidence. On the one hand, the arguments that knowledge is interest-relative look like they will generalise to show that evidence too is interest-relative. On the other hand, our best story of how interests affect knowledge presupposes an interest-invariant notion of evidence. -/- The aim of this paper is to sketch a theory of evidence that is interest-relative, but which allows that ‘best story’ to go through with minimal changes. The core idea is that (...)
  7. added 2018-08-06
    Wittgensteinian contextualism against epistemic relativism.Francois-Igor Pris - 2018 - APRIORI. Серия: Гуманитарные науки 5:1-37.
  8. added 2018-06-19
    Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism, and Disagreement: Reply to Robin McKenna.Ian M. Church - 2012 - Philosophical Writings:100-103.
    There are two issues I want to very briefly raise in response to Robin McKenna’s paper, “Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism, and Disagreement.” First, I want to question whether or not the disagreement problem faced by indexical contextualism is truly a problem. Secondly, I want to consider whether or not McKenna’s solution is really in keeping with indexical contextualism.
  9. added 2018-04-04
    Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
  10. added 2018-02-17
    Stanley on the Knowledge-Relation.Steffen Borge - 2008 - SATS 9 (1):109-124.
    The latest newcomer on the epistemology scene is Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), which is the view that even though the semantics of the verb “know” is invariant, the answer to the question of whether someone knows something is sensitive to factors about that person. Factors about the context of the purported knower are relevant to whether he knows some proposition p or not. In this paper I present Jason Stanley's version of SSI, a theory Stanley calls Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI). The core (...)
  11. added 2018-02-17
    WAMming Away at Contextualism.Martijn Blaauw - 2003 - SATS 4 (1):88-97.
    Contextualism is a quite popular research program nowadays. In essence, the contextualist holds that the truth conditions of knowledge attributing and of knowledge denying sentences vary in accordance with the context in which the sentences are uttered. This theory is positively motivated by its capability of best explaining certain intuitions we have about knowledge attributions and knowledge denials. In this paper, I will argue that this positive motivation isn't as compelling as the contextualists think it to be. This I will (...)
  12. added 2018-02-10
    Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense, Written by Peter Baumann. [REVIEW]Guido Melchior - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien.
  13. added 2017-11-24
    Knowledge and Availability.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573.
    The mentioning of error-possibilities makes us less likely to ascribe knowledge. This paper offers a novel psychological account of this data. The account appeals to “subadditivity,” a well-known psychological tendency to judge possibilities as more likely when they are disjunctively described.
  14. added 2017-10-19
    Third‐Person Knowledge Ascriptions: A Crucial Experiment for Contextualism.Jumbly Grindrod, James Andow & Nat Hansen - 2018 - Mind and Language:1-25.
    In the past few years there has been a turn towards evaluating the empirical foundation of epistemic contextualism using formal (rather than armchair) experimental methods. By-and-large, the results of these experiments have not supported the original motivation for epistemic contextualism. That is partly because experiments have only uncovered effects of changing context on knowledge ascriptions in limited experimental circumstances (when contrast is present, for example), and partly because existing experiments have not been designed to distinguish between contextualism and one of (...)
  15. added 2017-09-28
    Anti-Intellectualism, Egocentrism and Bank Case Intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2841-2857.
    Salience-sensitivity is a form of anti-intellectualism that says the following: whether a true belief amounts to knowledge depends on which error-possibilities are salient to the believer. I will investigate whether salience-sensitivity can be motivated by appeal to bank case intuitions. I will suggest that so-called third-person bank cases threaten to sever the connection between bank case intuitions and salience-sensitivity. I will go on to argue that salience-sensitivists can overcome this worry if they appeal to egocentric bias, a general tendency to (...)
  16. added 2017-09-28
    The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions: A Defence of Moderate Invariantism.Leonid Tarasov - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Manchester
    This work has four aims: (i) to provide an overview of the current debate about the semantics of knowledge attributions, i.e. sentences of the form ⌜S knows that Φ⌝; (ii) to ground the debate in a single semantic-pragmatic framework; (iii) to identify a methodology for describing the semantics of knowledge attributions; (iv) to go some way towards describing the semantics of knowledge attributions in light of this methodology, and in particular to defend moderate invariantist semantics against its main current rivals. (...)
  17. added 2017-09-18
    On Folk Epistemology. How We Think and Talk About Knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. -/- A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained (...)
  18. added 2017-09-08
    Uma introdução ao Contextualismo na Epistemologia Contemporânea.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.) - 2013 - Porto alegre: EDIPUCRS.
    Este livro oferece uma introdução ao Contextualismo Epistemológico e se destina aos leitores que possuem algumas noções/aptidões bem gerais sobre filosofia, mais especificamente sobre Teoria do Conhecimento ou Epistemologia, mas não requer qualquer conhecimento prévio sobre o Contextualismo e, portanto, acredito que deva ser de grande utilidade para estudantes e pesquisadores que se interessem e pretendam trabalhar com esse interessante tópico. Tendo em vista que ele reflete boa parte da minha pesquisa realizada durante o doutoramento, entendo que ele não deva (...)
  19. added 2017-08-23
    Die Bedeutung von "wissen". Eine Untersuchung zur Kontextabhängigkeit von Wissensaussagen.Erik Stei - 2014 - Paderborn: Mentis.
  20. added 2017-06-29
    Strange-but-True: A New Argument for Contextualism About ‘Know’.Paul Dimmock - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2005-2015.
    A powerful objection to subject-sensitive invariantism concerns various ‘strange-but-true’ conditionals. One popular response to this objection is to argue that strange-but-true conditionals pose a problem for non-sceptical epistemological theories in general. In the present paper, it is argued that strange-but-true conditionals are not a problem for contextualism about ‘know’. This observation undercuts the proposed defence of SSI, and supplies a surprising new argument for contextualism.
  21. added 2017-06-22
    Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-Stakes Cases​.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Episteme.
    One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in high stakes when the target propositions seem to be inappropriate premises for practical reasoning. According to an account suggested by Williamson, our intuitive judgments are erroneous due to an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between first-order and higher-order knowledge: the high-stakes subject lacks the latter but possesses the former. In this paper, I provide three objections to Williamson’s account: i) his account delivers (...)
  22. added 2017-05-28
    Experimenting on Contextualism.Nat Hansen & Emmanuel Chemla - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):286-321.
    This paper concerns the central method of generating evidence in support of contextualist theories, what we call context shifting experiments. We begin by explaining the standard design of context shifting experiments, which are used in both quantitative surveys and more traditional thought experiments to show how context affects the content of natural language expressions. We discuss some recent experimental studies that have tried and failed to find evidence that confirms contextualist predictions about the results of context shifting experiments, and consider (...)
  23. added 2017-05-28
    Stewart Cohen and the Contextualist Theory of Justification.Ahamd Reza Hemmati Moghaddam - 2011 - Filozofia 66:347-352.
    Epistemic contextualism is a thesis about truth conditions of knowledge ascribed to sentences such as “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p”. According to contextualists it is the speaker’s context – the one attributing knowledge – that is pertinent to the truth conditions and truth value of knowledge attributions. Thus, in one context a speaker might say “S knows p” while in another context another he/she might say “S does not know p” without any contradiction involved. (...)
  24. added 2017-05-28
    Contextualism, Comparatives and Gradability.Daniel Halliday - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):381 - 393.
    Contextualists about knowledge ascriptions perceive an analogy between the semantics they posit for “know(s)” and the semantics of comparative terms like “tall” and “flat”. Jason Stanley has recently raised a number of objections to this view. This paper offers a response by way of an alternative analogy with modified comparatives, which resolves most of Stanley’s objections. Rather than being ad hoc, this new analogy in fact fits better with platitudes about knowledge and facilitates a better understanding of the semantics of (...)
  25. added 2017-05-28
    Grice's Razor.Allan Hazlett - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):669-690.
    Grice’s Razor is a principle of parsimony which states a preference for linguistic explanations in terms of conversational implicature, to explanations in terms of semantic context-dependence. Here I propose a Gricean theory of knowledge attributions, and contend on the basis of Grice’s Razor that it is superior to contextualism about ‘knows’.
  26. added 2017-05-28
    Shiffer's Objections to DeRose's Contextualism.Smiljana Gartner - 2006 - Synthesis Philosophica 21 (1):81-94.
    If the classical argument from skepticism is true, then we cannot claim that we know something and this also affects our ordinary claims about life, nature and us. DeRose proposes the New Contextualist Solution. Shiffer argues against DeRose’s explanation about the strength of the epistemic position. He also finds contextualist’s claim that in knowledge sentences without indexical terms the skeptical paradox arises, problematic. In this paper, I am trying to argue that we should look at examples in which the same (...)
  27. added 2017-05-28
    Précis of Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):476–481.
  28. added 2017-05-22
    Contextualism and Knowledge Norms.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 177-189.
    I provide an opinionated overview of the literature on the relationship of contextualism to knowledge norms for action, assertion, and belief. I point out that contextualists about ‘knows’ are precluded from accepting the simplest versions of knowledge norms; they must, if they are to accept knowledge norms at all, accept “relativized” versions of them. I survey arguments from knowledge norms both for and against contextualism, tentatively concluding that commitment to knowledge norms does not conclusively win the day either for contextualism (...)
  29. added 2017-05-22
    Gradability and Knowledge.Blome-Tillmann Michael - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. London: Routledge. pp. 348--357.
    Epistemic contextualism (‘EC’), the view that the truth-values of knowledge attributions may vary with the context of ascription, has a variety of different linguistic implementations. On one of the implementations most popular in the early days of EC, the predicate ‘knows p’ functions semantically similarly to gradable adjectives such as ‘flat’, ‘tall’, or ‘empty’. In recent work Jason Stanley and John Hawthorne have presented powerful arguments against such implementations of EC. In this article I briefly systematize the contextualist analogy to (...)
  30. added 2017-05-22
    Introduction—What is Epistemic Contextualism?Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - In Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. London: Taylor & Francis.
    Introduces contextualism about knowledge ascriptions, and provides a brief summary of the contributions to the Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism.
  31. added 2017-05-22
    Blome-Tillmann Michael, Knowledge and Presuppositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. X + 197 Pp. [REVIEW]Patrick Rysiew - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):126-132.
  32. added 2017-05-22
    Epistemic Relativism: Inter-Contextuality in the Problem of the Criterion.Rodrigo Laera - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (2):153-169.
    This paper proposes a view on epistemic relativism that arises from the problem of the criterion, keeping in consideration that the assessment of criterion standards always occurs in a certain context. The main idea is that the epistemic value of the assertion “S knows that p” depends not only on the criterion adopted within an epistemic framework and the relationship between said criterion and a meta-criterion, but also from the collaboration with other subjects who share the same standards. Thus, one (...)
  33. added 2017-05-22
    Less Evidence, Better Knowledge.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2015 - McGill Law Journal 60 (2):173-214.
    In his 1827 work Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Jeremy Bentham famously argued against exclusionary rules such as hearsay, preferring a policy of “universal admissibility” unless the declarant is easily available. Bentham’s claim that all relevant evidence should be considered with appropriate instructions to fact finders has been particularly influential among judges, culminating in the “principled approach” to hearsay in Canada articulated in R. v. Khelawon. Furthermore, many scholars attack Bentham’s argument only for ignoring the realities of juror bias, admitting universal (...)
  34. added 2017-05-22
    Does 'Knowledge' Function Like a Quantifier? A Critique of Stanley.Giovanni Mion - 2015 - Philosophical Inquiries 3 (2):9-16.
    In “Elusive Knowledge” (1996), David Lewis deduces contextualism about 'knowledge' from an analysis of the nature of knowledge. For Lewis, the context relativity of 'knowledge' depends upon the fact that knowledge that p implies the elimination of all the possibilities in which ~p. But since 'all' is context relative, 'knowledge' is also context relative. In contrast to Lewis, in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley argues that since all context sensitive expressions can have different interpretations within the same discourse, (...)
  35. added 2017-05-22
    A Contradiction for Contextualism?Peter Baumann - 2014 - In Franck Lihoreau & Manuel Rebuschi (eds.), Epistemology, Context, and Formalism. Springer. pp. 49-57.
    This discusses a problem for epistemic contextualism having to do with the possibility of evaluating knowledge attributions made in other contexts.
  36. added 2017-05-22
    Asking for Reasons as a Weapon: Epistemic Justification and the Loss of Knowledge.Ian Werkheiser - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):173-190.
    In this paper, I will look at what role being able to provide justification plays in several prominent conceptions of epistemology, and argue that taking the ability to provide reasons as necessary for knowledge leads to a biasing toward false negatives. However, I will also argue that asking for reasons is a common practice among the general public, and one that is endorsed by “folk epistemology.” I will then discuss the fact that this asking for reasons is done neither constantly (...)
  37. added 2017-05-22
    Contextualism, Safety and Epistemic Relevance.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):383-394.
    The paper discusses approaches to Epistemic Contextualism that model the satisfaction of the predicate ‘know’ in a given context C in terms of the notion of belief/fact-matching throughout a contextually specified similarity sphere of worlds that is centred on actuality. The paper offers three counterexamples to approaches of this type and argues that they lead to insurmountable difficulties. I conclude that what contextualists (and Subject-Sensitive Invariantists) have traditionally called the ‘epistemic standards’ of a given context C cannot be explicated in (...)
  38. added 2017-05-15
    A New Solution to the Skeptical Puzzle: An Epistemic Account of Limited Polysemy.Katherine S. Broeksmit - 2012 - Dissertation,
    In my Thesis I investigate many of the standard accounts of knowledge. I argue that epistemic fallibilism, infallibilism, and contextualism fail as viable accounts. I defend an account of knowledge according to which 'knows' is ambiguous. More specifically, I promote an account of knowledge according to which 'knows' is polysemous. This position was advanced by Rene Van Woudenberg. At the end of my thesis, I propose an adjustment to Van Woudenberg's view that will protect his account from problematic implications.
  39. added 2017-05-15
    Confusion About Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Dylan Dodd - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):381 - 396.
    Concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs) are knowledge attributions of the form ‘S knows p, but it’s possible that q’, where q obviously entails not-p (Rysiew, Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 35:477–514, 2001). The significance of CKAs has been widely discussed recently. It’s agreed by all that CKAs are infelicitous, at least typically. But the agreement ends there. Different writers have invoked them in their defenses of all sorts of philosophical theses; to name just a few: contextualism, invariantism, fallibilism, infallibilism, and that the knowledge (...)
  40. added 2017-05-15
    The Indexicality of 'Knowledge'.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):29 - 53.
    Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections of this kind, viz. at what I call (...)
  41. added 2017-05-15
    Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]Richard Feldman - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):211–226.
  42. added 2017-05-15
    Withdrawal and Contextualism.Jonathan E. Adler - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):280–285.
  43. added 2017-05-15
    Review: Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]A. Brueckner - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):160-165.
  44. added 2017-05-15
    A Noncontextualist Account of Contextualist Linguistic Data.Mylan Engel Jr - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (2):56-79.
    The paper takes as its starting point the observation that people can be led to retract knowledge claims when presented with previously ignored error possibilities, but offers a noncontextualist explanation of the data. Fallibilist epistemologies are committed to the existence of two kinds of Kp -falsifying contingencies: (i) Non-Ignorable contingencies [NI-contingencies] and (ii) Properly-Ignorable contingencies [PI-contingencies]. For S to know that p, S must be in an epistemic position to rule out all NI-contingencies, but she need not be able to (...)
  45. added 2017-05-15
    Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects.Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
    In this paper we survey some main arguments for and against epistemological contextualism. We distinguish and discuss various kinds of contextualism, such as attributer contextualism (the most influential version of which is semantic, conversational, or radical contextualism); indexicalism; proto-contextualism; Wittgensteinian contextualism; subject, inferential, or issue contextualism; epistemic contextualism; and virtue contextualism. Starting with a sketch of Dretske's Relevant Alternatives Theory and Nozick's Tracking Account of Knowledge, we reconstruct the history of various forms of contextualism and the ways contextualists try to (...)
  46. added 2017-05-15
    Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.
  47. added 2017-05-15
    Contextualism and the Neglected Question of Context.John Morrison - 2001 - Dissertation,
    A satisfactory contextualist theory of knowledge must provide an account of how knowledge varies across contexts. There are three contextualist proposals for developing such an account. This paper demonstrates that all of them are unacceptable. Contextualists have therefore failed to provide a satisfactory theory of knowledge.
  48. added 2017-05-15
    Now You Know It, Now You Don't.Keith DeRose - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.
    Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s (...)
  49. added 2017-05-15
    Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193 - 197.
  50. added 2017-04-20
    The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions.Michael Hannon - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
    Knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are a central area of research in philosophy. But why do humans think and talk about knowledge? What are knowledge ascriptions for? This article surveys a variety of proposals about the role of knowledge ascriptions and attempts to provide a unified account of these seemingly distinct views.
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