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Keith DeRose [65]Keith Douglas Derose [1]
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Profile: Keith DeRose (Yale University)
  1. Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
  2. Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
    This paper uses the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) in defense of epistemological contextualism. Part 1 explores the main problem afflicting contextualism, what I call the "Generality Objection." Part 2 presents and defends both KAA and a powerful new positive argument that it provides for contextualism. Part 3 uses KAA to answer the Generality Objection, and also casts other shadows over the prospects for anti-contextualism.
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  3. Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
  4. The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism.Keith DeRose - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198.
    I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.
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  5. Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys.Keith DeRose - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):81-110.
    I will here sharply oppose all the phases of the story Schaffer & Knobe tell. In Part 1 we will look at the supposed empirical case against standard contextualism, and in Part 2 we will investigate Schaffer & Knobe’s supposed empirical case for the superiority of contrastivism over standard contextualism.
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  6. Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 187--205.
    In epistemology, “contextualism” denotes a wide variety of more-or-less closely related positions according to which the issues of knowledge or justification are somehow relative to context. I will proceed by first explicating the position I call contextualism, and distinguishing that position from some closely related positions in epistemology, some of which sometimes also go by the name of “contextualism”. I’ll then present and answer what seems to many the most pressing of the objections to contextualism as I construe it, and (...)
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  7. Epistemic Possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
  8. Single Scoreboard Semantics.Keith DeRose - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):1-21.
    What happens to the "conversational score" when speakers in a conversation push the score for a context-sensitive term in different directions? In epistemology, contextualists are often construed as holding that both the skeptic ("You don't know!") and her opponent ("Oh, yes I do!") speak truthfully when they debate. This assumes a "multiple scoreboards" version of contextualism. But contextualists themselves typically opt for "single scoreboard" views on which such apparently competing claims really do conflict. This paper explores several single scoreboard options (...)
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  9.  6
    ``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context&Quot.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
  10. Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries.Keith DeRose - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568 – 580.
  11. The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1.Keith DeRose - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Contextualism has been hotly debated in recent epistemology and philosophy of language. The Case for Contextualism is a state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing the most powerful arguments in favor of the view and responding to the most pressing objections facing it.
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  12. "Bamboozled by Our Own Words": Semantic Blindness and Some Arguments Against Contextualism.Keith DeRose - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):316 - 338.
    The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions are to be found in how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, nonphilosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as “knowledge” in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others. Contextualists typically appeal to pairs of cases that forcefully display the variability in the epistemic standards that govern ordinary usage: A “low standards” case (henceforth, “LOW”) in which a speaker seems quite appropriately and truthfully to ascribe knowledge (...)
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  13. The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Keith DeRose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
    Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of “Assertion, Knowledge and Context” establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for “I know that P” vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the varying standards that (...)
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  14. Insensitivity is Back, Baby!Keith DeRose - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):161-187.
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  15. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader.Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
    Recently, new life has been breathed into the ancient philosophical topic of skepticism. The subject of some of the best and most provocative work in contemporary philosophy, skepticism has been addressed not only by top epistemologists but also by several of the world's finest philosophers who are most known for their work in other areas of the discipline. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader brings together the most important recent contributions to the discussion of skepticism. Covering major approaches to the skeptical problem, (...)
     
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  16. Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?Keith Derose - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.
    fits our evidence.[1] I will propose some potential counter-examples to test this evidentialist thesis. My main intention in presenting the “counter-examples” is to better understand Feldman’s evidentialism, and evidentialism in general. How are we to understand what our evidence is, how it works, and how are we to understand the phrase “epistemically ought to believe” such that evidentialism might make sense as a plausible thesis in light of the examples? Of course, we may decide that there’s no such way to (...)
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  17. Now You Know It, Now You Don't.Keith DeRose - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.
    Resistance to contextualism comes in the form of many very different types of objections. My topic here is a certain group or family of related objections to contextualism that I call “Now you know it, now you don’t” objections. I responded to some such objections in my “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” a few years back. In what follows here, I will expand on that earlier response in various ways, and, in doing so, I will discuss some aspects of David Lewis’s (...)
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  18. Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses.Keith DeRose - 2004 - In J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 22--41.
    Fortunately for those of us who work on the topic, Ernie Sosa has devoted much of his (seemingly inexhaustible) intellectual energy to the problem of philosophical skepticism. And to great effect. With the three exceptions of Peter Unger, whose 1975 Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism is a grossly under-appreciated classic of epistemology; Timothy Williamson, whose 2000 Knowledge and its Limits is, I hope, on its way to being a less underappreciated classic; and Thomas Reid, I have benefitted more from Sosa’s (...)
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  19. Gradable Adjectives: A Defence of Pluralism.Keith DeRose - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):141-160.
    This paper attacks the Implicit Reference Class Theory of gradable adjectives and proposes instead a ?pluralist? approach to the semantics of those terms, according to which they can be governed by a variety of different types of standards, one, but only one, of which is the group-indexed standards utilized by the Implicit Reference Class Theory.
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  20. Conditional Assertions and "Biscuit" Conditionals.Keith DeRose & Richard E. Grandy - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):405-420.
    kind of joke to ask what is the case if the antecedent is false—“And where are the biscuits if I don’t want any?”, “And what’s on PBS if I’m not interested?”, “And who shot Kennedy if that’s not what I’m asking?”. With normal indicative conditionals like.
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  21. How Can We Know That We 'Re Not Brains in Vats?'.Keith DeRose - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
    This should be fairly close to the text of this paper as it appears in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), Spindel Conference Supplement: 121-148.
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  22. Forthcoming,'Single Scoreboard Semantics'.Keith DeRose - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
     
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  23.  77
    Relevant Alternatives and the Content of Knowledge Attributions.Keith Derose - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):193 - 197.
  24.  54
    Can It Be That It Would Have Been Even Though It Might Not Have Been?Keith DeRose - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):385-413.
    The score was tied in the bottom of the ninth, I was on third base, and there was only one out when Bubba hit a towering fly ball to deep left-center. Although I’m no speed-demon, the ball was hammered so far that I easily could have scored the winning run if I had tagged up. But I didn’t. I got caught up in the excitement and stupidly played it half way, standing between third and home until I saw the center (...)
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  25. Descartes, Epistemic Principles, Epistemic Circularity, and Scientia.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):220-238.
  26. Questioning Evidentialism.Keith DeRose - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
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  27.  33
    Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of Evil.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):497 - 512.
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  28.  1
    ``The Conditionals of Deliberation&Quot.Keith DeRose - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):1-42.
    Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between ‘straightforward’ future-directed conditionals like ‘If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby’ and ‘ “were”ed-up’ FDCs like ‘If the house were not to be painted, (...)
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  29.  44
    Replies to Nagel, Ludlow, and Fantl and McGrath. [REVIEW]Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):703-721.
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  30. Are Christian Beliefs Properly Basic?Keith DeRose - manuscript
    This is the text for a presentation I gave at the Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, D.C. on December 28, 1998. It was written very quickly, and I haven't had time to go back and fix it up, but I probably won't have time to fix it up any time soon, and several people have requested copies, so I don't see any harm in making it available. Please remember that it is a draft, and don't (...)
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  31.  18
    Precis of The Case for Contextualism.Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):675-677.
  32.  39
    Reid's Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism.Keith DeRose - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):313-348.
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  33.  93
    Voodoo Epistemology.Keith DeRose - manuscript
    A critical examination of Alvin Plantinga's attempted defense against the dreaded "Great Pumpkin Objection" to his theistic-belief-as-properly-basic religious epistemology.
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  34.  46
    Lewis on 'Might' and 'Would' Counterfactual Conditionals.Keith DeRose - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):413 - 418.
  35. Review of J. Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests[REVIEW]Keith DeRose - 2007 - Mind 116:486-489.
     
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  36. Externalism and Skepticism.Keith DeRose - manuscript
    A few years back, I participated in the Spindell Conference in Memphis, and gave a paper, “How Can We Know That We’re Not Brains in Vats?” (available on-line at: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~kd47/Spindell.htm). The bulk of that paper concerned responses to skepticism. I pursued an unusually radical criticism of the often-criticized “Putnam-style” responses to skepticism. To put it rather enigmatically, I argued that such responses don’t work even if they work! And I compared such responses with the type of response I favor – (...)
     
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  37. Universalism and the Bible.Keith DeRose - manuscript
    I should be clear at the outset about what I'll mean -- and won't mean -- by "universalism." As I'll use it, "universalism" refers to the position that eventually all human beings will be saved and will enjoy everlasting life with Christ. This is compatible with the view that God will punish many people after death, and many universalists accept that there will be divine retribution, although some may not. What universalism does commit one to is that such punishment won't (...)
     
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  38. Might God Have Reasons for Not Preventing Evils?Keith DeRose - manuscript
    Virtually all monotheistic religions profess that there is a divine being who is extremely powerful, knowledgeable, and good. The evils of this world present various challenges for such religions. The starkest challenge is directed toward views that posit a being whose power, knowledge, and goodness are not just immense, but are as great as can be: an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being (for short, an oopg being). For it would seem that such a being would have the power, the (...)
     
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  39.  83
    Knowledge and its Limits.Keith DeRose - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):573-577.
  40. Responding to Skepticism.Keith DeRose - manuscript
    exactly as the essay appears in Skepticism. It's pretty close, though. In the version that appears in the book, page references to other essays in Skepticism refer to page numbers in the book, while below page references are, for the most part, to the original place of publication of the essays referred to. Also, I below make one correction (in red) of a factual error..
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  41. Direct Warrant Realism.Keith DeRose - 2005 - In Andrew Dole & Andrew Chignell (eds.), God and the Ethics of Belief: New Essays in Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge University Press.
    Direct Realism often emerges as a solution to a certain type of problem. Hume and, especially, Berkeley, wielding some of the most powerful arguments of 18th Century philosophy, forcefully attacked the notion that there could be good inferences from the occurrence of one’s sensations to the existence of external, mind-independent bodies. Given the success of these attacks, and also given the assumption, made by Berkeley and arguably by Hume as well, that our knowledge of and rational belief in the existence (...)
     
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  42. Review of T. Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits.Keith DeRose - manuscript
    Though he’s perhaps best known for his work on vagueness, Timothy Williamson also produced a series of outstanding papers in epistemology in the late 1980's and the 1990's. Knowledge and its Limits brings this work together. The result is, in my opinion, the best book in epistemology to come out since 1975.
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  43. The Conditionals of Deliberation + Whither Middle Knowledge?Keith DeRose - manuscript
    Work in progress. Will probably split into two papers, and then, perhaps, later, will be brought back together, along with other material, into something larger. (All this only if it works out OK!).
     
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  44.  62
    Précis of The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. [REVIEW]Keith Derose - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):675-677.
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  45. Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?Keith Derose - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):697-706.
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  46. I. The Problem.Keith DeRose - unknown
    In some lottery situations, the probability that your ticket's a loser can get very close to 1. Suppose, for instance, that yours is one of 20 million tickets, only one of which is a winner. Still, it seems that (1) You don't know yours is a loser and (2) You're in no position to flat-out assert that your ticket is a loser. "It's probably a loser," "It's all but certain that it's a loser," or even, "It's quite certain that it's (...)
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  47. Reply to Nagel 5/23; 18bot+End.Keith DeRose - unknown
    The key test cases for deciding between my brand of contextualism and Jennifer Nagel’s brand of invariantism are the third-person examples. As matters currently stand, first-person cases, like my original Bank cases (pp. 1-2), are pretty useless here. Nagel can agree that the speaker’s claim to “know” in Case A and his admission that he doesn’t “know” in Case B are both true; she just accepts a different account of why it is that both assertions can be, and are, true, (...)
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  48. Review of Stanley (2005). [REVIEW]Keith DeRose - 2007 - Mind 116 (2007):116.
     
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  49. Skepticism: Contemporary Readings.Keith DeRose & Ted Warfield (eds.) - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
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  50. (2) There is Evil in the World.Keith DeRose - manuscript
    Plantinga construes the “atheologian” as claiming that “the conjunction of these two propositions is necessarily false, false in every possible world,” while Plantinga “aims to show that there is a possible world in which (1) and (2) are both true.”.
     
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