Synthese 118 (2):121-143 (1999)

Authors
Noa Latham
University of Calgary
Abstract
Nearly 30 years have passed since Donald Davidson first presented his ar- gument against the possibility of psychophysical laws in “Mental Events”. The argument applies to intentional rather than phenomenal properties, so whenever I refer to mental properties and to psychophysical laws it should be understood that I mean intentional properties and laws relating them to physical properties. No consensus has emerged over what the argument actually is, and the subsequent versions of it presented by Davidson show significant differences. But many have been inclined to agree with the spirit of the argument and with its conclusion.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005052912629
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 59,968
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind.William Child - 1994 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Three Varieties of Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 1991 - In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 153-166.
Supervenience.Jaegwon Kim (ed.) - 2002 - Ashgate.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Supervenience, Dynamical Systems Theory, and Non-Reductive Physicalism.Jeffrey Yoshimi - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2):373-398.
General Solution to All Philosophical Problems With Some Exceptions.Wayde Beasley - forthcoming - north of parallel 40: Numerous uncommitted.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Some Anomalies in Kim’s Account of Davidson.Alexander Miller - 1993 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):335-44.
Davidson and Social Scientific Laws.Lee McIntyre - 1999 - Synthese 120 (3):375-394.
Psychophysical Laws.Jaegwon Kim - 1985 - In Brian P. Mclaughlin & Ernest Lepore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell.
Laws and Development.David Resnik - 1997 - Synthese 112 (1):37-51.
Why Even Kim-Style Psychophysical Laws Are Impossible.Steven G. Daniel - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):225-237.
Laws and Their Stability.Marc Lange - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):415Ð432.
Evaluating Practical Reasoning.Douglas Walton - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):197-240.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,232 ( #3,438 of 2,433,318 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #97,872 of 2,433,318 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes