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Julie Yoo [11]Julie Hyon Ju Yoo [1]
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Profile: Julie Yoo (California State University, Northridge)
  1. Anomalous Monism.Julie Yoo - 2009 - In Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This is an overview of Davidson's theory of anomalous monism. Objections and replies are also detailed.
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  2. The Other Explanatory Gap.Julie Yoo - manuscript -
    One of the driving questions in philosophy of mind is whether a person can be understood in purely physical terms. In this presentation, I wish to continue the project initiated by Donald Davidson, whose subtle position on this question has left many more perplexed than enlightened. The main reason for this perplexity is Davidson’s rather obscure pronouncements about the normativity of intentionality and its role in supporting psychophysical anomalism – the claim that there are no laws bridging our intentional states (...)
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  3. New Hope for Non-Reductive Physicalism.Julie Yoo - 2008 - In Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitget (eds.), Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences.
    Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses: first, that mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is true. Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable – to honor one thesis, one must abandon the other. In this paper, I present an account of property realization that addresses Kim’s criticism and that explains how the two theses are indeed comfortably compatible.
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  4.  53
    Meaning and Normativity. [REVIEW]Julie Yoo - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):310-324.
  5. The Normativity of Intentionality.Julie Yoo - 2004 - In Johann Marek & Maria Reicher (eds.), Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Experience and Analysis.
    Davidson has been instrumental in dampening the prospect of reductively explaining the mind. The core of his arguments turn upon his insistence that contentful mental states, the bread and butter of folk psychology, have a “normative element.” In spite of its pivotal role, as well as its intrinsic interest, the concept is very poorly developed and understood. This paper attempts to discern four different strands of the normativity of intentionality and to spark a long overdue systematic examination of a fascinating (...)
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  6. Folk Psychology and Moral Evaluation.Julie Yoo - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):237-251.
    Assessments of an action done intentionally, as we might expect, influence judgments of moral responsibility. What we don't expect is the converse--judgments of moral responsibility influencing assessments of whether an action was done intentionally. Yet this is precisely how people decide, according to Knobe (2003, 2004) and Mendlow (2004) and Nadelhoffer (2004a). I evaluate whether the studies actually support this biasing effect. I argue that the studies are at best inconclusive and that even if they demonstrated that people fall under (...)
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  7. Review: Fodor: Language, Mind, and Philosophy. [REVIEW]Julie Yoo - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):1092-1095.
  8.  91
    Mental Causation.Julie Yoo - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is an encyclopedia entry on accounts of mental causation, starting from Descartes to the present.
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  9.  29
    History of the Mind-Body Problem.Julie Yoo - 2005 - Teaching Philosophy 28 (1):80-83.
  10. Folk Psychology and Moral Evaluation.Julie Yoo - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):237-241.
    Assessments of an action done intentionally, as we might expect, influence judgments of moral responsibility. What we don't expect is the converse--judgments of moral responsibility influencing assessments of whether an action was done intentionally. Yet this is precisely how people decide, according to Knobe and Mendlow and Nadelhoffer. I evaluate whether the studies actually support this biasing effect. I argue that the studies are at best inconclusive and that even if they demonstrated that people fall under the biasing effect, such (...)
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  11. Feminist Philosophy of Mind (Forthcoming).Julie Yoo - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.