Leiblichkeit und Begrifflichkeit. Überlegungen zum Begriff der Wahrnehmung nach Merleau-Ponty und McDowell
Abstract
This paper (in German) is a contribution to the ongoing engagement of phenomenological authors with John McDowell's philosophy of perception (most prominent in the so-called Dreyfus-McDowell-Debate). First, I argue that McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a common topic (the intentionality of perception), a common question (how is it possible?), a common position in the debate (neither empiricism nor intellectualism provide satisfactory answers to the question), and a common conviction (no epistemic intermediaries must be allowed in accounting for perceptual openness to the world). However, Merleau-Ponty thinks that in order to understand openness to the world, we must understand perception as necessarily embodied, whereas McDowell thinks that we must understand it as necessarily conceptual. I call these approaches the embodiment claim and the conceptuality claim, respectively. I outline four elements of the embodiment claim which lead many phenomenologically oriented authors to suppose that it is incompatible with the conceptuality claim. I then go on to show, drawing on McDowell's writings, that the supposition is unwarranted in all four cases. I conclude that the embodiment claim and the conceptuality claim are compatible, they can be combined. I end by giving some rough hints why I think that they should, in fact must be combined in order to give a satisfactory account of perception. This will be the topic of another paper.