Abstract

In this dissertation, I develop a new theory for distinguishing between analytic and synthetic truths. Despite being a somewhat new combination of views, each individual view in the theory is firmly grounded in a number of earlier theories given throughout the Analytic tradition. For this reason, Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the theories of various Positivists and Wittgensteinians, Quine, and Kripke from a contemporary perspective. Chapter 2 provides an explication and evaluation of the work which began the contemporary discussion on the analytic/synthetic distinction, Paul Boghossian’s distinctions between epistemic/metaphysical analyticity and the analytic theories of the a priori/necessity. Chapter 3 introduces the work of the most important theorist of metaphysical analyticity, Gillian Russell. Here, I work toward a compromise between Boghossian and Russell which involves advocating for epistemic and metaphysical analyticity via a principle which connects implicit definitions and reference-determination. Given that I defend epistemic and metaphysical analyticity—and that Boghossian thinks a defense of epistemic analyticity yields a defense of the analytic theory of the a priori—Chapter 4 turns to a discussion of the analytic theory of necessity. Here, I argue that Russell’s basic problem for the analytic theory of necessity is the most troubling for the proponent of this view, but that there are still potential avenues open for solving it. Finally, in Chapter 5, I bring the earlier chapters together to try to show that, while they do not directly argue for a traditional theory of analyticity, they do undermine various arguments against such a theory.