BonJour’s Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and his Explanatory Account

Dialogue 52 (2):287-304 (2013)

BonJour claims that he has found a way out of the Sellarsian dilemma. In this paper, I argue for three claims to show that his alleged solution fails. First, there are two requirements for being a good reason, and BonJour’s notion of non-conceptual awareness of sensory experience faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. Second, he derives his idea of the so-called “constitutive awareness of content” from his conception of conscious occurrent belief. But this conception also faces an analogous dilemma with regard to these requirements. Third, his explanatory account faces the problem of representation. BonJour affirme qu’il a trouvé un moyen de sortir du dilemme sellarsien de la justification non-doxastique. Dans cet article, je soutiens trois thèses afin de montrer que sa solution alléguée échoue. Tout d’abord, il y a deux exigences pour qu’une raison soit bonne, et la notion de prise de conscience non-conceptuelle de l’expérience sensorielle développée par BonJour donne lieu à un dilemme sérieux en ce qui concerne ces exigences. Deuxièmement, il tire son idée de la soi-disant «prise de conscience constitutive du contenu» de sa conception de la croyance consciente et occurrente. Mais cette conception conduit à un dilemme analogue à l’égard de ces exigences. Troisièmement, son explication se heurte au problème de la représentation
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DOI 10.1017/s0012217313000176
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Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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