Epistemic Injustice, Autism and the Neurodiversity Movement

Filozofska Istrazivanja 39 (1):171-188 (2019)
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Abstract

Knowledge can be acquired through the processes of listening or reading testimonies of other agents. How and, particular, to whom, one ascribes trustworthiness when listening or reading a testimony is of special interest in this paper, especially in terms of societal-epistemic deviations that appear in the form of epistemic injustice. Neurotypicals, individuals with typical neurological states and developmental pathways, perceive individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder as an aberration from neuro-normativity, unable to contribute on an equal basis to the pool of epistemic resources and shared meanings. The latter is related to the stereotypes of the unreliability of autistic persons’ testimonies about their own experiences and conditions. Given that atypical social and behavioural conditions autistics share are clinically classified as a disorder, the question of whether we can justify the failure to extend trust to the autistics arises.

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