Some problems of perceptions

Philosophy of Science 37 (March):100-113 (1970)
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Abstract

Many philosophers have maintained that secondary qualities are private mental entities. In this paper I use the discussions of H. A. Prichard, Berkeley and G. E. Moore on the status of secondary qualities to bring out the assumptions that underlie this view. One of these is that secondary qualities are particular. I show that Prichard holds these assumptions and then I attempt to diagnose why he holds them. In the course of this diagnosis I explore several senses of 'dependent' which play a role in this view. Finally, I show that a causal dependence of secondary qualities upon the perceiver will not lead to the conclusion that secondary qualities are private unless the philosophical thesis that they are particular is already assumed

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Douglas Lewis
University of Minnesota

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References found in this work

The refutation of idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.
The principles of human knowledge.George Berkeley & T. E. Jessop - 1937 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 138:234-235.
Perceptual relativity and ideas in the mind.Phillip Cummins - 1963 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (December):202-214.
Berkeley's idealism.Edwin B. Allaire - 1963 - Theoria 29 (3):229-244.
The Sense-Datum Fallacy.H. A. Prighard - 1938 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 17 (1):1-18.

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