The discretionary normativity of requests

Philosophers' Imprint 18:1-16 (2018)
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Abstract

Being able to ask others to do things, and thereby giving them reasons to do those things, is a prominent feature of our interpersonal lives. In this paper, I discuss the distinctive normative status of requests – what makes them different from commands and demands. I argue for a theory of this normative phenomenon which explains the sense in which the reasons presented in requests are a matter of discretion. This discretionary quality, I argue, is something that other theories cannot accommodate, though it is a significant aspect of the relations that people stand in to one another, and the kinds of practical reasons that flow from those relations.

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James H. P. Lewis
Cardiff University

Citations of this work

Convergence, Community, and Force in Aesthetic Discourse.Nick Riggle - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (47).
Praise as Moral Address.Daniel Telech - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 7.
The Paper Chase Case and Epistemic Accounts of Request Normativity.Danny Weltman - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (4):199-205.
What Makes Requests Normative? The Epistemic Account Defended.Daniel Weltman - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (64):1715-43.

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References found in this work

Ethics without principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980.Bernard Williams - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.
Two kinds of respect.Stephen Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.

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