Abstract

A correspondence theory of truth involves at least three constituents; the truth bearer, propositions, which stand in a relation of correspondence to the third element, the truth maker, some objects or fact with which the truth maker must correspond. Correspondence theories differ about the nature of truth makers, over whether one needs to include properties, and in particular over whether facts must be assumed in addition in order to give a correct account not merely of the conditions under which propositions are true, but also what makes them true. Simple modal propositions state that objects necessarily or possibly have certain properties. What makes such propositions true? In this paper I want to consider various candidates for an account of the truth makers of modal propositions. After rejecting several alternatives that rely only on objects and properties, i.e., truth conditions, I will present several refinements of a fact based theory culminating in the view that truth makers for modal propositions are actual or non-actual facts which have facts and possible worlds as constituents.