European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3):31-47 (2019)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate adequately prudential concern about one’s future self. More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope. I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope.
|
Keywords | Analytic Theology David Lewis Four-dimensionalism Hope Hud Hudson Life after death Materialism Metaphysics Persistence Personal Identity Philosophy of Mind |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2958 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time.David Wiggins - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (1):90-95.
View all 19 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Temporal Parts and Their Individuation.J. Copeland, H. Dyke & D. Proudfoot - 2002 - Analysis 61 (4):289-292.
A Problem for Christian Materialism.Elliot Jon Knuths - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):205-213.
An Epistemological Problem for Resurrection.Yann Schmitt - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):219--230.
Ought a Four-Dimensionalist to Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 619-646.
Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts?Josh Parsons - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):399-418.
Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):619-646.
Was Bonaventure a Four-Dimensionalist?Damiano Costa - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):393-404.
Immanent Causation and Life After Death.Eric T. Olson - 2010 - In G. Gasser (ed.), Personal Identity and Resurrection. Ashgate. pp. 51-66.
The Frustrating Problem For Four-Dimensionalism.A. P. Taylor - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1097-1115.
A Reply to Anders’ ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being: Van Inwagen and the Dilemma of Material Survival of Death’.Thomas Atkinson - 2015 - Sophia 54 (4):577-592.
3.5-Dimensionalism and Survival. A Process-Ontological Approach.Godehard Brüntrup - 2010 - In Georg Gasser (ed.), Personal Identity and Resurrection. How Do We Survive Our Death? Ashgate. pp. 67-85.
Christian Metaphysics and Human Death.Ken A. Bryson - 2015 - Philosophy and Theology 27 (2):259-288.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2019-09-20
Total views
57 ( #177,819 of 2,421,440 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #45,532 of 2,421,440 )
2019-09-20
Total views
57 ( #177,819 of 2,421,440 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #45,532 of 2,421,440 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads