Authors
Jonathan J. Loose
School of Advanced Study, University of London
Abstract
Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate adequately prudential concern about one’s future self. More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope. I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope.
Keywords Analytic Theology  David Lewis  Four-dimensionalism  Hope  Hud Hudson  Life after death  Materialism  Metaphysics  Persistence  Personal Identity  Philosophy of Mind
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DOI 10.24204/ejpr.v11i3.2958
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