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  1. The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing how (...)
  2.  96
    Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...)
  3. Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. She rejects the traditional picture of Kant's ethics as a cold vision of the moral life which emphasises duty at the expense of love and value. Rather, Kant's work is seen (...)
  4. The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
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  5. The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology ...
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  6. Skepticism About Practical Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
    Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is (...)
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  7. Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
  8. The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    This paper criticizes two accounts of the normativity of practical principles: the empiricist account and the rationalist or realist account. It argues against the empiricist view, focusing on the Humean texts that are usually taken to be its locus classicus. It then argues both against the dogmatic rationalist view, and for the Kantian view, through a discussion of Kant's own remarks about instrumental rationality in the second section of the Groundwork. It further argues that the instrumental principle cannot stand alone. (...)
     
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  9.  56
    Fellow Creatures. Our Obligations to the Other Animals.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):165-168.
  10. Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1989 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (2):103-31.
  11. The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 (4):325-349.
    One of the great difficulties with Kant’s moral philosophy is that it seems to imply that our moral obligations leave us powerless in the face of evil. Kant’s theory sets a high ideal of conduct and tells us to live up to that ideal regardless of what other persons are doing. The results may be very bad. But Kant says that the law "remains in full force, because it commands categorically" (G, 438-39/57).* The most weI1—known example of...
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  12.  29
    Skepticism About Practical Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
  13.  25
    Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Christine M. Korsgaard presents a compelling new view of our moral relationships to the other animals. She offers challenging answers to such questions as: Are people superior to animals, and does it matter morally if we are? Is it all right for us to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets?
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  14. Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (Supplement):99-122.
    In this paper I trace the development of one of the central debates of late twentieth-century moral philosophy—the debate between realism and what Rawls called “constructivism.” Realism, I argue, is a reactive position that arises in response to almost every attempt to give a substantive explanation of morality. It results from the realist’s belief that such explanations inevitably reduce moral phenomena to natural phenomena. I trace this belief, and the essence of realism, to a view about the nature of concepts—that (...)
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  15. Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine Korsgaard - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the Good Life. Oup Usa.
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  16. Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals.Christine M. Korsgaard - unknown
    Christine M. Korsgaard is Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. She was educated at the University of Illinois and received a Ph.D. from Harvard. She has held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, and visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. She is a member of the American Philosophical Association and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has published extensively on Kant, and about moral (...)
     
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  17. The Activity of Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 83 (2):23 - 43.
    Then you have a look around, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening to us—I mean the people who think that nothing exists but what they can grasp with both hands; people who refuse to admit that actions and processes and the invisible world in general have any place in reality.
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  18. Kant's Formula of Universal Law.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1985 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1-2):24-47.
  19. The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):24-51.
    To later generations, much of the moral philosophy of the twentieth century will look like a struggle to escape from utilitarianism. We seem to succeed in disproving one utilitarian doctrine, only to find ourselves caught in the grip of another. I believe that this is because a basic feature of the consequentialist outlook still pervades and distorts our thinking: the view that the business of morality is to bring something about . Too often, the rest of us have pitched our (...)
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  20. Primates and Philosophers. How Morality Evolved.Frans de Waal, Stephen Macedo, Josiah Ober, Robert Wright, Christine M. Korsgaard & Philip Kitcher - 2007 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 69 (3):598-599.
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  21. Constitutivism and the Virtues.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (2):98-116.
    In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are “constitutive standards” of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomousl...
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  22. Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (1):1-29.
    Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is (...)
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  23. From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - In Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Cambridge University Press.
    Aristotle believes that an agent lacks virtue unless she enjoys the performance of virtuous actions, while Kant claims that the person who does her duty despite contrary inclinations exhibits a moral worth that the person who acts from inclination lacks. Despite these differences, this chapter argues that Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view of the object of human choice and locus of moral value: that what we choose, and what has moral value, are not mere acts, but actions: acts (...)
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  24. The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (1):19-51.
    This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why the (...)
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  25. Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action.Christine Korsgaard - 2006 - In Stephen Macedo & Josiah Ober (eds.), Primates and Philosophers. Princeton University Press.
     
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  26. The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live. Oxford University Press.
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  27. Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account.Christine Korsgaard - unknown
    1. Being an Animal Human beings are animals: phylum: chordata, class: mammalia, order: primates, family: hominids, species: homo sapiens, subspecies: homo sapiens sapiens. According to current scientific opinion, we evolved approximately 200,000 years ago in Africa from ancestors whom we share with the other great apes. What does it mean that we are animals? Scientifically speaking, an animal is essentially a complex, multicellular organism that feeds on other life forms. But what we share with the other animals is not just (...)
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  28. Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):8-23.
  29. Kant's Formula of Humanity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Kant Studien 77 (1-4):183-202.
  30. Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:305-332.
  31. Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self: A Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind.Christine Korsgaard - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):49-66.
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    Reflections on The Evolution Of Morality.Christine Korsgaard - 2010 - The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 5:1-29.
    In recent years a number of biologists, anthropologists, and animal scientists have tried to explain the biological evolution of morality, and claim to have found the rudiments of morality in the altruistic behavior of our nearest nonhuman relatives. I argue that there is one feature of morality to which these accounts do not pay adequate attention: normative self-government, the capacity to be motivated to do something by the thought that you ought to do it. This is a feature of the (...)
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  33. Acting for a Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2005 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 40 (1):11-35.
    The use of the English word “reason” in all of these contexts, and the way we translate equivalent terms from other languages, suggests a connection, but what exactly is it? Aristotle and Kant’s conception of what practical reasons are, I believe, can help us to answer this question, by bringing out what is distinctive, and distinctively active, about acting for a reason. That, at least, is what I am going to argue.
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  34.  13
    Exploring the Role of Exemplarity in Education: Two Dimensions of the Teacher’s Task.Morten Timmermann Korsgaard - 2019 - Ethics and Education 14 (3):271-284.
    ABSTRACTThis paper explores the role of exemplarity in education through a conceptualisation of two different dimensions of exemplarity in educational practice. Pedagogical exemplarity, which relates to the pedagogical and ethical dimension of educational practice. In other words, this dimension explores the educational moments when someone takes up an exemplary function in educational practice. Didactical exemplarity, which relates to the exemplary function of subject matter or educational content. In other words, this dimension explores the educational moments when something takes up an (...)
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  35. The Relational Nature of the Good.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:1.
  36. Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Ethics 96 (3):486-505.
    Kant holds that the good will is a source of value, In the sense that other things acquire their values from standing in an appropriate relation to it. I argue that aristotle holds a similar view about contemplation, And that this explains his preference for the contemplative life. They differ about what the source of value is because they differ about which kind of activity, ethical or contemplative, discovers meaning and purpose in the world.
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  37. Kantian Ethics, Animals, and the Law.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2013 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 33 (4):629-648.
    Legal systems divide the world into persons and property, treating animals as property. Some animal rights advocates have proposed treating animals as persons. Another option is to introduce a third normative category. This raises questions about how normative categories are established. In this article I argue that Kant established normative categories by determining what the presuppositions of rational practice are. According to Kant, rational choice presupposes that rational beings are ends in themselves and the rational use of the earth’s resources (...)
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  38. A Kantian Case for Animal Rights.Christine Korsgaard - unknown
    Most legal systems divide the world into persons and property, treating human beings as persons, and pretty much everything else, including non-human animals, as property. Persons are the subjects of both rights and obligations, including the right to own property, while objects of property, being by their very nature for the use of persons, have no rights at all. I will call this the “legal bifurcation.” We might look to Immanuel Kant’s moral and political philosophy to provide a philosophical vindication (...)
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  39. Personhood, animals, and the law.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2013 - Think 12 (34):25-32.
    ExtractThe idea that all the entities in the world may be, for legal and moral purposes, divided into the two categories of ‘persons’ and ‘things’ comes down to us from the tradition of Roman law. In the law, a ‘person’ is essentially the subject of rights and obligations, while a thing may be owned as property. In ethics, a person is an object of respect, to be valued for her own sake, and never to be used as a mere means (...)
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  40. Facing the Animal You See in the Mirror.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):4-9.
    A contribution to a panel on ethics and animals forthcoming in The Harvard Review of Philosophy.
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  41. Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls.Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman & Christine M. Korsgaard (eds.) - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    The essays in this volume offer an approach to the history of moral and political philosophy that takes its inspiration from John Rawls. All the contributors are philosophers who have studied with Rawls and they offer this collection in his honour. The distinctive feature of this approach is to address substantive normative questions in moral and political philosophy through an analysis of the texts and theories of major figures in the history of the subject: Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant and (...)
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  42. On Having a Good.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (3):405-429.
    You are the kind of entity for whom things can be good or bad. This is one of the most important facts about you. It provides you with the grounds for taking a passionate interest in your own life, for you are deeply concerned that things should go well for you. Presumably, you also want to do well, but that may be in part because you think that doing well is good for you, and that your life would be impoverished (...)
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  43. Aristotle on Function and Virtue.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (3):259 - 279.
  44. Constructing Protagorean Objectivity.Errnanno Bencivenga, Nadeem Hussein, Christine Korsgaard, James Lenman, Peter de Mameffe, James Nickel, David Plunkett, James Pryor, Andrews Reath & Michael Ridge - 2012 - In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    At least since the late Early Modern period, the Holy Grail of ethics, for many philosophers, has been to say how ethical values could have a kind of protagorean objectivity: values are to be both fully objective as values and yet depend on us by their very nature. More than any other contemporary foundational approach it is “constructivist” theories, such as those due to Rawls, Scanlon, and Korsgaard, which have consciously sought to explain how protagorean objectivity is a real possibility. (...)
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  45.  14
    Diving for Pearls. Thoughts on Pedagogical Practice and Theory.Morten Timmermann Korsgaard - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 53 (1):180-199.
  46. The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1-2):3-42.
    Hume thinks moral judgments are based on sentiments of approval and disapproval we feel when we contemplate someone from a "general point of view." We view her through the eyes of her "narrow circle" and judge her in accordance with general rules. Why do we take up the general point of view? Hume also argues that approval is a calm form of love, love of character, which sets a normative standard for other forms of love. In this paper I explain (...)
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  47. Natural Goodness, Rightness, and the Intersubjectivity of Reason: Reply to Arroyo, Cummiskey, Moland, and Bird-Pollan.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (4):381-394.
    Abstract: In response to Arroyo, I explain my position on the concept of “natural goodness” and how my use of that concept compares to that of Geach and Foot. An Aristotelian or functional notion of goodness provides the material for Kantian endorsement in a theory of value that avoids a metaphysical commitment to intrinsic values. In response to Cummiskey, I review reasons for thinking Kantianism and consequentialism incompatible, especially those objections to aggregation that arise from the notion of the natural (...)
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  48. “Normativity, Necessity, and the Synthetic A Priori: A Re-Sponse to Derek Parfit.Christine Korsgaard - unknown
    If I understand him correctly, Derek Parfit’s views place us, philosophically speaking, in a very small box. According to Parfit, normativity is an irreducible non-natural property that is independent of the human mind. That is to say, there are normative truths - truths about what we ought to do and to want, or about reasons for doing and wanting things. The truths in question are synthetic a priori truths, and accessible to us only by some sort of rational intuition. Parfit (...)
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  49. Two Arguments Against Lying.ChristineM Korsgaard - 1988 - Argumentation 2 (1):27-49.
    Kant and Sidgwick are at opposite extremes on whether we may tell paternalistic lies. I trace the extremism to their views about ethical concepts. Sidgwick thinks fundamental ethical concepts must be precise. Common Sense morality says we may tell paternalistic lies to children but not to sane adults. Because the distinction between a child and an adult is imprecise, Sidgwick thinks this principle cannot be fundamental, and must be based on the {precise) principle of utility, which often mandates paternalistic lies (...)
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  50. Pearl Diving and the Exemplary Way Educational Note Taking and Taking Note in Education.Morten Timmermann Korsgaard - 2021 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 53 (13):1350-1358.
    In this paper, I will explore the experience of noticing/becoming attentive to something in education. What does it mean to take notice of something in an educational way, and how does something become educationally noteworthy? In order to grasp in more detail the idea of something being noteworthy, I turn to the metaphor of pearl diving – as this appears in the works of Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin - and to Martin Wagenschein’s theory of exemplarity. These perspectives helps us (...)
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