Authors
William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
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Keywords Brain Processes  Epistemology  Functionalism  Machine  Mental States  Science  Putnam, H
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DOI 10.1080/00048407412341031
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References found in this work BETA

What Psychological States Are Not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
Comments.Alvin Plantinga - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (20):585-587.

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Citations of this work BETA

Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Naturalizing Intentions.R. J. Nelson - 1984 - Synthese 61 (2):173 - 203.
Armstrong's Materialism.George S. Pappas - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (September):569-592.

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