Itaca 24:184-200 (2013)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In The moral problem (1994), Michael Smith tries to link three
conflicting theories that alone are intuitively plausible, nevertheless, they do
not seem to work well together. The first proposes that moral judgments are in
fact beliefs about objective matters. The second states the concept of “practicality requirement”. The third is a humean belief-desire psychology,
i.e. if a moral judgment is sufficient to explain actions, then it must
involve a desire. If that is the case, it cannot be simply a belief. For Smith, any
attempt to solve the moral problem must find a way to hold all three doctrines.
I will argue that his solution rests on two false assumptions. The first, a
rationalist one which supports that what we have reason to do is what we
would desire to do if we were fully rational. The second is the internalist
thesis about moral motivation according to which a person who believes she is
morally required to do something is either necessarily motivated to do it or
she is practically irrational. I will base my critics on four objections raised by
Copp, Miller, Shafer-Landau, Brink and Sayre-McCord.
|
Keywords | metaethcis reason moral motivation |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Moral Motivation and the Externalist Challenge.Shambhavi Shankar - 2015 - Rerum Causae 7 (1):118-128.
Mapping Moral Motivation.Eve Garrard & David McNaughton - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):45-59.
Motivational Internalism and the Authority of Morality.James Edwin Mahon - 2000 - Dissertation, Duke University
Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
Ethical Internalism and Externalism.Sharon E. Sytsma - 1991 - Dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago
Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism. Oxford University Press.
Defusing Counterexamples Against Motivational Internalism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Filosofija. Sociologija 27 (1):23-30.
Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.
Moral Reasoning. Moral Motivation and the Rational Foundation of Morals.Luz Marina Barreto - manuscript
Moral Coherence, Moral Worth and Explanations of Moral Motivation.Aristophanes Koutoungos - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (3):59-79.
Alternative Motivation: A New Challenge to Moral Judgment Internalism.Andrew Sneddon - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):41 – 53.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2018-05-29
Total views
129 ( #90,432 of 2,505,180 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #59,961 of 2,505,180 )
2018-05-29
Total views
129 ( #90,432 of 2,505,180 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #59,961 of 2,505,180 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads