Mapping moral motivation

Abstract
In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that our version of internalism can be defended against putative counter-examples. All theories of motivation which take what motivates to be a psychological state run foul of the following plausible constraint: the reason why you ought to do an action and the reason why you do it can be the same. In our view, however, while what motivates is a reason (which is a fact) the state of being motivated is a cognitive stage, viz. the belief that one has reason to act. In cases where the agent's relevant beliefs are false, then she has no reason to act, but nontheless her action can be explained in other ways.
Keywords moral motivation  internalism  reasons  cognitive theory of motivation
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1009925220105
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,606
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Blackwell.
Skepticism About Practical Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Interpersonal Recognition and Responsiveness to Relevant Differences.Arto Laitinen - 2006 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9 (1):47-70.
Motivation in Agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.
Moral Fetishism Revisited.Teemu Toppinen - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):305–313.
Does Particularism Solve the Moral Problem?Kasper Lippert-rasmussen & Karsten Klint Jensen - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):125 – 140.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
What’s Wrong with Morality?C. Daniel Batson - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):230-236.
An Internalist Dilemma—and an Externalist Solution.Caj Strandberg - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):25-51.
Reasons and the Ambiguity of 'Belief'.Maria Alvarez - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):53 – 65.
Moral Motivation Pluralism.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
Hypothetical Motivation.Donald C. Hubin - 1996 - Noûs 30 (1):31-54.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

58 ( #90,394 of 2,168,630 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #346,816 of 2,168,630 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums